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After 26 months of uncertainty regarding attempts to subvert precepts of the Colombian
Constitution and force an amendment to allow President Alvaro Uribe to run for a third-consecutive
term, the judiciary rejected those efforts and dealt a harsh blow to the Partido Social de la Unidad
Nacional (Partido de la U), a coalition of rightist groups created in 2002 to free Uribe from having to
submit to the party discipline imposed by the most conservative sectors of the traditional Partido
Liberal (PL). The court decision was unequivocal and damaging for amendment supporters.
In its decision, seven of the nine members of the Corte Constitucional (CC), the body charged
with upholding and ensuring respect for the Constitution, said that, besides procedural errors in
the effort to hold a re-electionist referendum, the initiative went against basic principles of any
republican form of government, such as separation of powers. "Therefore, we are not dealing with
mere procedural irregularities but with substantial violations of democratic principles," read the
decision. In the wake of the Feb. 26 court decision, Colombia prepared for the most confusing and
shortest electoral campaign in history. The most confusing, because the stage had been set for
Uribe to head the La U ticket, and now, although he is the leader of an overwhelming majority of
the rightist majority in Colombia, he has been excluded from the contest without having given
his blessing to a replacement. And the shortest, because legislative elections will take place on
March 14, and, on May 30, voters will have to choose a president from among at least seven
hopefuls, only one of whom, La U candidate and former defense minister Juan Manuel Santos,
has voter-preference ratings above 20%. So far, no candidate really stands out. All polls point
to a June 20 runoff in which Santos will likely compete with whoever comes in second, a great
unknown since four of the candidates' poll numbers are separated by just one percentage point.
Referendum promoters violated law's form, substance In October 2007, the Partido de la U launched
a campaign to gather enough signatures to call a referendum to explicitly approve Uribe's run for
a third-consecutive term, which was constitutionally prohibited (See NotiSur, 2008-06-27). The
same had been true with his first re-election bid in 2006 until the Constitution was amended (see
NotiSur, 2005-10-28 and NotiSur, 2005-12-02). The Constitution sets very precise rules for calling
a referendum, including the number of signatures required and even the amount of money that
can be poured into a get-out-the-vote campaign. Both are determined by the number of registered
voters. Violations of both requirements, proved in a court-ordered investigation, invalidated the
congressional vote to back a referendum, although the president's most fervent supporters alleged
that the ruling "addressed merely procedural problems not substantive ones." Among those
partisans was a theoretically neutral central figure within Colombia's institutional framework,
Procurador General de la Nacion Alejandro Ordonez, who argued that irregularities occurring
during the signature-gathering process "cannot be so powerful as to prevail over the will of citizens
who signed to keep the president in office." The court highlighted serious "irregularities of form
and substance." Among the former, the signature-gathering campaign collected and spent six times
more money than organizers of the Asociacion Colombiana Primero (an offshoot of the Partido de
la U) were constitutionally authorized to spend on the process. Even more disturbing, the leaders
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of the fund-raising campaign and its largest contributor included the firm Transval, the flagship
business of financial institution DMG (for David Murcia Guzman, the owner). DMG was a holding
company closed by the government in 2009, after it was proved to have swindled no less than 2
million small investors in a Ponzi-type scheme, taking their money and promising earnings of up
to 150% (see NotiSur, 2009-02-06). Murcia Guzman is in prison for laundering drug money, bribing
various legislators, and helping fund paramilitary groups, the armed wing of the ultraright and large
landowners, which are accused of murdering thousands of people. Many paramilitary bosses, who
negotiated with the judiciary for reduced sentences and the guarantee of not being extradited to the
US, admitted having tortured, killed, and dismembered more than 30,000 Colombians (see NotiSur,
2010-03-05). Three of the irregularities of substance are very serious. One was illegally convening
the Camara de Diputados to vote on the referendum bill, which would then be sent on to the
Senate. At present, 86 deputies are being investigated by the judiciary for allegedly receiving large
cash payments and other privileges to vote for the Uribista bill. Two are in prison and five others,
although still at large, have been convicted of suddenly switching parties and joining the governing
coalition at almost the exact time that they voted for the referendum and after receiving large
amounts of money. The second irregularity was that the Camara de Diputados met illegally, with
only governing-coalition members present and without requesting the constitutionally required
notification in the Diario Oficial. And the third was that the text approved by the deputies differed
from that approved by the senators. In the lower house version, it was unclear whether Uribe could
be re-elected in 2010 or in 2014. The original said that a person "who has exercised the [office of the]
presidency of the republic for two consecutive terms could be re-elected for another." The senators
warned that the language was confusing, and they modified the text. "Exercised" was changed to
"elected." Under that change, it would not be necessary to finish two terms to run for a third, but it
would be enough to have been "elected" for two terms, a condition met by Uribe. Desperate times
call for desperate measures Most political analysts had maintained that Uribe's popularity would
automatically transfer to whoever replaced him. However, polls taken after the court's decision
show that not to be the case, which is worrying sectors of the right and has given rise to several
desperate proposals in the few days since Feb. 26. Efrain Torrado, vice president of Congress and
a high-level La U leader, expressed his fears about a defeat and suggested that, "to guarantee our
victory," Uribe should request a vacation and join Santos' electoral campaign. Constitutionally, the
president is prohibited from participating in campaign activities. Then it was Sen. Roy Barreras'
turn. He proposed that Uribe join a ticket as the vice presidential candidate. Barreras said that, once
the slate had won, the president-elect could ask for a leave of absence or resign, allowing Uribe to
be sworn in again as president, exactly what the court said could not happen. The five opposition
candidates, whose total support comprises less than half the electorate, are running up against
polling data showing that Colombians want the next president to strengthen Uribe's "democraticsecurity" policy. The policy, a form a state violence, or even, many say, state terrorism, has brought
Uribe condemnation from the leading international human rights groups (see NotiSur, 2006-09-08).
In theory, this method of repressing guerrilla organizations has allowed Uribe to achieve a dubious
and limited success in confronting the rebels but at a very high price. An example of the high price
is the rupture in relations with Ecuador and Venezuela, two of the most important markets for
Colombian exports, as a result of the Colombian military's bloody incursion into Ecuador in 2008
that killed a guerrilla leader and 20 rebels (see NotiSur, 2008-05-09, 2008-08-01, 2009-07-31). The
opposition candidates have criticized Uribe's democratic-security policy but they know that, today,
to propose any change would make them unelectable. Analysts agree that Uribe represents a before
and an after in Colombian political history and that his governing style will influence whoever is
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chosen to lead Colombia in the next four years. An analyst with the Colombian magazine Semana
says that, until Uribe was elected, all presidents tried to win over the electorate by proposing peace
accords with the guerrillas, solidly established for more than four decades. "Uribe moved the
country to the right, and, since he took office, signing a peace treaty is no longer what counts but
rather winning the war." For Semana, that rightward turn can be observed in the authoritarian
concept of order, in turning the economy over to the large economic interests, in Uribe's unnuanced
alignment with the US, and in the tacit subordination of the state to the Catholic Church. Should the
governing-coalition candidate win, his mission will be to maintain and strengthen those leanings. If
the winner is from the opposition, analysts say that the person will have no choice but to continue in
Uribe's footsteps.

-- End --
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